"I think it's possibly the beginning of the end of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I think it's that serious. We just can't sit back and let this happen."

General James Jones, USMC (Ret.), former Supreme Allied Commander Europe

Washington Examiner, October 19th, 2015

Almost since its inception in Washington D.C. in April 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been at one crossroads or another in which its demise was imminent. But, despite crises such as Suez and Eastern Europe in 1956; the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962; Leonid Brezhnev's ruthless end to the Prague Spring in 1968; the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War in which America and Russia almost collided; the Euro Missile crisis of the early 1980's; and the end of the Cold War, NATO endured.

After the Soviet Union imploded, NATO's core task of defending against a Warsaw Pact attack disappeared. NATO's leadership recognized that stability in Europe had increasing global linkages well beyond the confines of the Atlantic. The decision was to move NATO responsibilities "out of area" or "go out of business."

On September 12th, 2001, the day after New York's Twin Towers came crashing down, for the first time in its history, NATO, under the leadership of its formidable Secretary General George Robertson, invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty declaring "an attack against one was an attack against all." NATO would soon be fighting its first land war not against Soviet forces but in far away Afghanistan.

NATO has since receded from Afghanistan. While conditions are unlikely to bring NATO back in full force, Vladimir Putin has returned the alliance's focus to Europe through annexation of Crimea in early 2014 and a military campaign supporting Russian-speaking separatists in Ukraine's east in a fight against Kyiv. Then came Syria.

Mr. Putin's military intervention into Syria earlier this month to support President Bashar al Assad's failing regime against a broad opposition, including radical Jihadis such as the Islamic State and al-Qaida, certainly surprised many on both sides of the Atlantic. While that deployment is militarily modest so far -- 2000 ground troops, scores of fighter and helicopter aircraft and defensive systems -- politically, psychologically and geostrategically it has had far greater impact. And the launch of several dozen Kaliber cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea to attack Syrian targets nine hundred miles away surely made certain political statements.

One consequence of Putin's expansive strategy, as General Jones underscores, has been a direct challenge to the West and to NATO and not just in Europe. So far, NATO responses have been tactical, not strategic. At last year's NATO biannual Summit in Wales, all twenty-eight members pledged to commit two percent of GDP to annual defense spending as a signal to Moscow. A Readiness Action Plan, new command structures including a Very High Readiness Joint force, a more robust training and exercise program and other actions were approved. Indeedt, some 30,000 NATO troops are engaged in a major exercise designed to reassure NATO nations on Russia's borders as well as signal intent and capability to Moscow.

How seriously Moscow regards these steps is an open question. But many observers do not believe Putin was impressed. NATO's reaction to the Syrian crisis has been entirely rhetorical. And Washington typically preferred to use words and not ideas or actions to deal with Moscow's military engagement in Syria.

So what does Putin's challenge mean for NATO today? Is NATO prepared to deal strategically with Russia in Europe and, as after the end of the Cold War, is the alliance prepared to look beyond Europe's borders to the south and east and take a larger role in promoting global stability as it once did?

Unfortunately, neither NATO nor Washington seems to understand Putin's strategy; what he seeks to achieve; what he is prepared to negotiate and what are the strengths and weaknesses of his situation. Nor has anyone in the west tried to leverage possible differences between Iran and Russia over the existential nature of the IS threat to help our position. And NATO appears foundering in dealing with fellow NATO member Turkey, let alone other powers in the region. The result is that NATO lacks an effective and visible strategy vis a vis Russia and what to do about Syria, Iran, IS and the region.

Thus, is NATO still relevant? Or is Mr. Putin turning NATO into a relic whose time has passed? As General Jones warns, NATO needs to make up its mind and do so now!

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Harlan Ullman is UPI's Arnaud de Borchgrave Distinguished Columnist; Chairman of the Killowen Group that advises leaders of government and business; and Senior Advisor at both Washington D.C.'s Atlantic Council and Business Executives for National Security. His latest book is A Handful of Bullets: How the Murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand Still Menaces the Peace.