First, do not try to undo all the personnel changes made by your predecessor. Some officers in fact needed to be pushed out, and as an outsider, fixing things back to "the way it was" is impossible.

There may be special cases, like appointing Stephen Kappes, who left in 2004, to the deputy director for operations slot. However, a wholesale return will only sow confusion and resentment among the people who remained and an unjustified sense of virtue among those who return.

Stop the reorganizations. Fiddling with tables of organization is not what is needed. When the organization gets healthy, it can be fine-tuned. If there is a mandated organizational change imposed on the agency from above, label it as such; when it is your idea, tell officers that. At least they will know the difference.

But unless there is something that cannot wait, tinker with the organization later. Resist any impulse to "demonstrate who is in charge."

The CIA has never had any problem understanding who is in charge; they have, however, on occasion had trouble believing that the person in charge knew what he was doing.

As director, you do indeed "do" personnel. Your predecessor said he did not, and it was easily the most resented remark he made during his entire tenure. The right people in the right jobs are what make the agency different from the other organizations in the intelligence community.

This is especially true of the Directorate of Operations, which involves only a handful of people worldwide. You have plenty of talented people working for you now; use them and do not go on a fishing expedition for the "perfect" person, especially among former agency officers. They don't make them like they used to, and that is probably a good thing.

Goss let his entourage alienate the entire building before he had settled in. Better to make enemies on your own. You probably brought some military aides with you, so you'll want to remind them that half the agency does not know the difference between a full colonel and a milkshake -- and those who do know don't care.

There are GS-13 case officers and analysts working for you who have daily, one-on-one relationships with general officers and politically powerful ambassadors. Colonels and lieutenant colonels are not going to impress the natives just by virtue of their shiny uniform. Your aides have to appreciate that they are not in the chain of command.

Get out of the uniform and make sure your aides do, as well. Agency officers wear no label, so you have to ask who they are and what they do. Give them the opportunity to do so.

Don't let anyone be asked to "dumb down" their work product for better understandability. The Directorate of Operations especially has a jargon that you need to learn. If it becomes a problem, hire a retired officer to help you and your people with the cultural translation. Before you change anything in the culture of the agency, first you need to understand it.

Get your security detail under control. They want to do the right thing, but more than one or two bodyguards inside the building makes people wonder if you are afraid of them.

The executive dining room is a really bad place to eat for anyone other than VIP guests. You will need to use it from time to time, but your staff would do better to be down in the cafeteria meeting people, not huddled up in a bunker wondering what the workforce thinks.

The RUMINT, or rumor intelligence, on you is that you like "corporate speak" and prefer large, impersonal gatherings to one-on-one encounters. You are going to have to work on this. Blunt, plain speech will get you further than anything else with the agency workforce.

Most of its officers feel that they have worked as hard as they can only to be lied to. If there is something bad, they want to hear the truth; if someone erred, they want to hear that, too. If something is going to happen to them, tell them before they see it in the Washington Post.

You are working with a bunch of spies, so you should not be surprised that RUMINT travels quickly and is surprisingly accurate in this culture. Count on it, and do not lie to them.

"I do not know" or "I cannot tell you" are statements the workforce understands and they accept they are sometimes necessary; but they will almost always find out if you lie.

Wander around the building and listen to people. The workforce is surprisingly smart and sophisticated; they will usually tell you what is wrong if you give them a chance.

Make time to find out where different units are physically located in the building, at least the big ones. It is amazing what you will learn when you go to them instead of them coming to you. Yes, you will be busy, but your first job, before anything else, is to make the workforce motivated and effective.

(Garrett Jones is a 1993 graduate of the U.S. Army War College. He served as a case officer with the CIA in Africa, Europe, and the Middle East, retiring in 1997. A version of this article was first published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute in its E-Notes newsletter. This material has been subject to pre-publication review by the CIA. That review neither constitutes CIA authentication of information nor implies CIA endorsement of the author's views.)

(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)

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