Based on the results of recent blue-ribbon panels and commissions it is clear that the US approach to providing national security through space assets is not working effectively. Complex space programs are taking too long to develop, cost too much and are not providing the performance needed to do the job.

The situation is further exacerbated by developing international competition and tightening US budgets. This is certainly not a new revelation, and many attempts have been made to improve the management and organization of how the government uses space for national security.

Efforts so far have had mixed results, but there have been some improvements. However, the magnitude of the shortcomings is so great that one might liken these efforts to that of "putting a bandage on a broken leg." The underlying problems are far too fundamental to correct with superficial fixes.

It is undoubtedly time to review realistic options for the future. First, let's agree that the challenges are not of a technical nature, but are surely based in the management and organization of the US national security space infrastructure. Thus, corrective options must address the roles and responsibilities of those that provide national security through space assets.

It is helpful to begin with the "big picture." There appears to be a spectrum of options for the US government to consider, ranging from "do nothing" to creating a cabinet level "Secretary of Space" position.

All of the evidence indicates the "do nothing" option means a loss of national security at a time when the world is becoming more dangerous. What we need is some "adult supervision" and a Presidential focus on fixing the management and organization infrastructure related to assuring continued effective national security space services.

Maybe we can gain some insight into the options by going to the high end of the option spectrum, i. e., create a Secretary of Space (SecSpace) who would head a Department of Space.

Since all government space activities provide direct or indirect national security services the SecSpace might be responsible for all DoD space, NRO, NASA and elements of other agencies. There likely would be several under secretaries of space, e. g., for defense, intelligence and civil programs.

Important advantages include a centralized space acquisition agent, and a single provider and operator for all national security space, civil space and other government space activities.

How will the Department of Space correct the current shortcomings? The SecSpace option would give national security space high-level national visibility and hopefully, a separate Congressional funding line in the budget.

It centralizes management and organization functions and eliminates duplication of assets and personnel, while providing long-needed accountability. Finally, this department should make the integration of defense, intelligence and civil elements of security easier at several levels.

Of course, any attempt to implement this option would create a great deal of pushback. There would be major organizational changes, personnel disruptions and Congressional approval for a new cabinet office and new line-item funding in the budget.

The new administration would have to spend a good deal of "political capital" to realize the needed cooperation from current cabinet members and Congress. Nothing less than a Presidential mandate for action would get the job done.

Given all of these difficulties it may be overly optimistic to expect such a dramatic paradigm shift to take place anytime soon. A more realistic expectation may be a solution that lies somewhere toward the center of the option spectrum.

Launchspace wants your ideas on how to fix national security space. Please let us know what the US should be doing. Send your thoughts to [email protected], and we will continue to pursue ideas on the right solution through our editorials.