1. "The reliability of the wire visual inspection process should be quantified (success rate in locating wiring defects may be below 70% under ideal conditions)."
2. "Wiring on the Orbiter Columbia [currently at Palmdale, CA, for its periodic down period for inspections and modifications] should be inspected for wiring damage in difficult-to-inspect regions. If any of the wires checked are determined to be especially vulnerable, they should be re-routed, protected, or replaced."
3. "The 76 CRIT 1 areas should be reviewed to determine the risk of failure and ability to separate systems when considering wiring, connectors, electrical panels, and other electrical nexus points. Each area that violates system redundancy should require a program waiver that outlines risk and an approach for eliminating the condition. The analysis should assume arc propagation can occur and compromise the integrity of all affected circuits. Another concern is that over 20% of this wiring can not be inspected due to limited access; these violation areas should as a minimum, be inspected during heavy maintenance and ideally be corrected."
4. "The SSP should review all waivers or deferred maintenance to verify that no compromise to safety or mission assurance has occurred."

The above recommendations were reviewed and dispositioned prior to the Flight Readiness Review for STS-103 (the first flight following the stand-down of the orbiter fleet for wire inspections).

• Thirty-seven recommendations identified as Short-Term (Solutions required prior to making more than four more flights)

• Thirty recommendations identified as Intermediate (Solutions required prior to January 1, 2001)

• Ten recommendations identified as Long-Term (Solutions required prior to January 1, 2005)

It is expected that actions to be taken in response to this report will cover near-term and long-term strategies that will lead to the development and infusion of new technologies and practices.

Additional Reporting Schedule
Two additional reports will be released on Monday March 13, also at Noon Eastern time via the NASA Home Page: the report on Faster, Better, Cheaper Project Management, and the final Report on Project Management in NASA by the Mars Climate Orbiter Mishap Investigation Board.

The report led by former Mars Pathfinder Project Manager Tony Spear was chartered by the Office of the Chief Engineer in mid- 1999 to make recommendations on a set of principles, tools and processes for ensuring NASA's success in adopting the "Faster, Better, Cheaper" approach to project planning, management and execution.

The Mars Climate Orbiter Phase I Report, released Nov. 10, 1999, identified the root cause and factors contributing to the Mars Climate Orbiter failure. The charter for this Phase II report, also led by Marshall Space Flight Center Director Art Stephenson, is to derive lessons learned from that failure and from other failed missions - as well as successful ones - and from them create a formula for future mission success.

An additional report, from the Mars Independent Assessment Team chaired by Thomas Young, will be available by the end of March. The team was chartered by Associate Administrator for Space Science Dr. Ed Weiler in the wake of the Mars Polar Lander failure to evaluate recent successful and unsuccessful deep space missions. Their assessment and findings will be considered in planning for future Mars exploration missions.